We study the problem of assigning jobs to applicants. Each applicant has a weight and provides a preference list, which may contain ties, ranking a subset of the jobs. An applicant x may prefer one matching to another (or be indifferent between them, in case of a tie) based on the jobs x gets in the two matchings and x's personal preference. A matching M is popular if there is no other matching M such that the weight of the applicants who prefer M to M exceeds the weight of those who prefer M to M .
INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of assigning jobs to applicants where every applicant provides a preference list, which may contain ties, ranking a subset of the jobs. More formally, an instance consists of a bipartite graph H = (A, J, E) with n vertices and m edges between a set of applicants A and a set of jobs J. The edge (x, p) belongs to E if job p is on x's preference list. Moreover, every edge (x, p) is assigned a rank r x ( p) ∈ Z + encoding the fact that p is x's r x ( p)th choice. An applicant x is said to prefer job p to q if the edge (x, p) is ranked higher than (x, q) , that is, r x ( p) < r x (q). If r x ( p) = r x (q), we have a tie, and we say x is indifferent between p and q. Likewise, we say x prefers one matching to another or is indifferent between them based on the jobs x is assigned by the two matchings. Our ultimate goal is to produce a "good" matching in H.
Despite its simplicity, this framework captures many real-world problems such as the assignment of government-subsidized houses to families [Yuan 1996 ], the assignment of graduates to training positions [Hylland and Zeeckhauser 1979] , and rental markets such as NetFlix where DVDs must be assigned to subscribers. The issue of what constitutes a fair or good assignment has been studied in the economics literature [Abdulkadiroǧlu and Sönmez 1998; Yuan 1996; Zhou 1990 ]. The least restrictive definition of optimality is that of a Pareto optimal matching [Abraham et al. 2004; Abdulkadiroǧlu and Sönmez 1998] . A matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no matching M such that at least one person prefers M to M and nobody prefers M to M . In this article, we study a stronger definition of optimality, that of popular matchings. We say M 1 is more popular than M 2 if the applicants who prefer M 1 to M 2 outnumber those who prefer M 2 to M 1 . A matching M is popular if there is no matching more popular than M.
Popular matchings were first considered by Gardenfors [1975] , who showed that not every instance allows a popular matching. Abraham et al. [2007] gave the first polynomial time algorithms to determine if a popular matching exists, and if so, to produce one: an O(n + m) time algorithm for the special case of strict preference lists, and an O( √ nm) time algorithm for the general case where ties are allowed. They noted that maximum cardinality matching can be reduced to finding a popular matching in an instance with ties (by letting every edge be of rank 1); thus, a linear time algorithm for the general case seems unlikely.
Notice that this definition of popular matching does not make any distinction between the individuals-the opinion of every applicant is valued equally. But what if we had some preferred set of applicants that we would like to give priority over the rest? This option becomes particularly interesting when jobs are scarce or there is a lot of contention for a few good jobs.
To answer this question, we propose a new definition for the more popular than relation under which every applicant x is given a positive weight w(x). The satisfaction of M 1 with respect to M 2 is defined as the weight of the applicants that prefer M 1 to M 2 minus the weight of those who prefer M 2 to M 1 . Then M 1 is more popular than M 2 if the satisfaction of M 1 with respect to M 2 is positive. We believe that this is an interesting generalization of popular matchings that addresses the natural need to assign priorities (weights) to the applicants while retaining the one-sided preferences of the original setup.
In this article, we develop algorithms to determine if a given instance allows a weighted popular matching, and if so, to produce one. For the case of strict preference lists, we give an O(n + m) time algorithm. When ties are allowed, the problem becomes more involved; a second algorithm solves the general case in O(min(k √ n, n)m) time, where k is the number of distinct weights that the applicants are given.
Our approach is based on deriving a more algorithmic-friendly characterization of popular matchings. Following the line of attack of Abraham et al. [2007] for unweighted instances, we define the notion of well-formed matchings and show that every popular matching is well formed. For unweighted instances, one can show [Abraham et al. 2007 ] that every well-formed matching is popular. For weighted instances, however, there may be well-formed matchings that are not popular. Our main contribution is to show that these nonpopular well-formed matchings can be weeded out by pruning certain bad edges that cannot be part of any popular matching. In other words, we show that the instance can be pruned so that a matching is popular if and only if it is well formed and is contained in the pruned instance.
Related Work
Following the publication of the work of Abraham et al. [2007] , the topic of unweighted popular matchings has been further explored in many interesting directions. Suppose we want to go from an arbitrary matching to some popular matching by a sequence of matchings each more popular than the previous; Abraham and showed that there is always a sequence of length of at most two and gave a linear time algorithm to find it. One of the main drawbacks of popular matchings is that they may not always exist; Mahdian [2006] partially addressed this issue by showing that the probability that a random instance admits a popular matching depends on the ratio α = |J| |A| and exhibits a phase transition around α * ≈ 1.42. Motivated by a house allocation application, Manlove and Sng [2006] gave fast algorithms for popular assignments with capacities on the jobs.
Very recently, some of the aforementioned results have been extended to the weighted case. Itoh and Watanabe [2010] study random instances with two weights and find that a similar phase transition occurs around α = ( 3 |A|), while Sng and Manlove [2010] give a fast algorithm for capacitated weighted matching.
A closely related, but not equivalent, problem is that of computing a rank-maximal matching. Here we want to maximize the number of rank 1 edges and, subject to this, maximize the number of rank 2 edges, and so on. Irving et al. [2006] showed how to solve this problem in O(min(R √ n), n)m) time where R is the rank of the lowest-ranked edge in a rank-maximal matching, while Kavitha and Shah [2006] gave a faster algorithm for dense instances that runs in O(Rn ω ), where ω < 2.376 is the exponent for matrix multiplication.
STRICT PREFERENCE LISTS
This section focuses on instances where the preference lists provided by the applicants are strict but need not be complete. In order to ease the analysis, we first modify the given instance: for each applicant x create a last-resort job l(x) and place it at the end of x's preference list. This modification does not affect whether the instance has a popular matching or not, but it does force every popular matching to be applicant complete.
Before proceeding, we need a few definitions. Let us partition A into categories C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C k , such that the weight of applicants in category C i is w i and w 1 > w 2 > · · · > w k > 0. Given a matching M, we say a node u is matched in M if there exits v such that (u, v) ∈ M; otherwise, u is free. We denote the mate of a matched node u by
M(u).
The plan is to develop an alternative characterization for popular matchings that will allow us to efficiently test if a given instance admits a popular matching, and if so, to produce one. Definition 2.1. Let x ∈ C i . If i = 1, define f (x) to be the first job on x's preference list; otherwise, if i > 1, define f (x) to be the first job p on x's list such that there is no y ∈ C j where j < i and f (y) = p. We say that f (x) is the first job of x, and that f (x) is an f i job.
Definition 2.2. Let x ∈ C i . Define s(x) be the first job p on x's preference list such that there is no y ∈ C j where j ≤ i and f (y) = p. We say that s(x) is the second job of x.
In other words, the first job of x ∈ C i is the first job on x's list that is not an f j job for some j < i, while the second job of x ∈ C i is the first job on x's list that is not an f j job for some j ≤ i. Notice that s(x) is ill defined when f (x) = l(x). This is not a problem because, as we will see shortly, the job s(x) is assigned to x only when there is contention for f (x), which by definition never happens when f (x) = l(x). The following properties of first and second jobs are easy to check: OBSERVATION 1. The set of f i jobs is disjoint from the set of f j jobs for j = i. The set of f i jobs is also disjoint from the set of s j jobs for j ≥ i but may not be for j < i.
Our alternative characterization for popular matchings is based on the notion of well-formed matchings. Definition 2.3. A matching is well formed if it has the following two properties: every f i job p is matched to some x ∈ C i where f (x) = p, and every applicant x is matched either to f (x) or s(x).
For the unweighted case (k = 1), our definition of well-formed matching coincides with the characterization developed by Abraham et al. [2007] . For k = 1, they showed that a matching is popular if and only if it is well formed. Unfortunately, when k > 1, not every well-formed matching is popular. For example, consider the instance in Figure 1 . There are only two well-formed matchings:
} is more popular than M 1 . On the other hand, M 2 is popular.
Nevertheless, we can still prove that being well formed is a necessary condition for being popular. PROOF. We use induction on i. For the base case, let x ∈ C 1 and f (x) = p. For the sake of contradiction, assume that p is matched to y and f (y) = p. If y ∈ C s for s > 1, then promote x to p and demote y to l(y). The swap improves the satisfaction by w 1 − w s > 0, but this cannot be because M is popular. If y ∈ C 1 , then promote x to p and y to f (y), and demote applicant z = M( f (y)) as depicted on the right. Thus, the satisfaction improves by w 1 + w 1 − w(z) > 0.
For the inductive case, let x ∈ C i and f (x) = p. Assume as before that M( p) = y and f (y) = p. If y ∈ C s for s > i, then promote x and demote y to get a change in satisfaction of w i − w s > 0. If y ∈ C s for s < i, then by induction f (y) is matched to z ∈ C s , promoting x to p and y to f (y), while demoting z changes the satisfaction by w i + w s − w s > 0. Finally, suppose y ∈ C i . Let z = M( f (y)) and suppose z ∈ C t . If t ≥ i, then the usual promotions change the satisfaction by at least w i . Note that if t < i, then f (z) = f (y) by definition of f (y). Letting y play the role of x in the previous argument handles this case. In every case, we have reached the contradiction that M is not popular; therefore, the lemma follows. LEMMA 2.6. Let M be a popular matching; then every x ∈ A is matched either to f (x) or s(x).
PROOF. As a consequence of Lemma 2.5, no x ∈ A can be matched to a job that is strictly better than f (x) or in between f (x) and s(x). Hence, we just need to show that x cannot be matched to a job that is strictly worse than s(x). For a contradiction, let us assume that x is matched to such a job.
Let x ∈ C i and p = s(x). Note that p must be matched to some applicant y ∈ C s ; otherwise, we get an immediate improvement by promoting x to p. If s > i, then promoting x and demoting y gives us a more popular matching because w i − w s > 0. Otherwise, s ≤ i, in which case f (y) = p. By Lemma 2.5 there exists z ∈ C s matched to f (y). Promoting x to s(x) and y to f (y) while demoting z improves the satisfaction by w i + w s − w s > 0, giving a contradiction.
Let G be the subgraph of H having only those edges between applicants and their first and second jobs. See the graph in Figure 1(b) . Theorem 2.4 tells us that every popular matching must be an applicant-complete matching in G where no f i job is free. Ideally, we would like every well-formed matching in G to be popular; unfortunately, this is not always the case. To remedy this situation, we will prune some edges from G that cannot be part of any popular matching. Then we will argue that every wellformed matching in the pruned graph must be popular. In order to state our pruning algorithm, we need the notion of promotion path. Definition 2.7. A promotion path with respect to a well-formed matching M is a
and for all i < j, applicant x i prefers p i+1 to p i . The cost of the path is defined as w(
Such a path can be used to free p 0 by promoting x i to p i+1 , for all i < j, while demoting x j . We say the cost (in terms of satisfaction) of the path is w(x j ) − w(x 0 ) − · · · − w(x j−1 ) because everyone gets a better job except x j . To illustrate this, consider the instance in Figure 1 and the well-formed matching
Definition 2.8. Let p be an f i job and M be a well-formed matching. The cost of freeing p in M, which we denote by λ M ( p), is the minimum cost among promotion paths out of p with respect to M.
We use the notation λ min M (x, r) as a shorthand for min q λ M (q) where q is a job that x prefers to r; if there is no such job, we define λ min M (x, r) = ∞. The following lemma is a useful tool to show that a certain matching is popular.
LEMMA 2.9. A well-formed matching M is popular if and only if
PROOF. We show the only if part first. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is y ∈ C i such that λ min M (y, M(y)) < w(y). This means there is a job q that y prefers to M(y) and a promotion path out of q whose cost λ M (q) equals λ min M (y, M(y)). Notice that the path does not span M(y) because either M(y) = f (y), in which case q and all other jobs in the path must be f j jobs for j < i, or M(y) = s(y), in which case all other jobs in the path must be f j jobs for j ≤ i. This means we can use the promotion path to free q and then promote y to it. The change in satisfaction is w(y) − λ M (y, M(y)) > 0, and so M is not popular.
We show the if part. Let M be any other matching and let y be an applicant that prefers M (y) to M(y). We construct a promotion path out of p 0 = M (y) as follows. Because M is well formed, it follows that p 0 is the first job of some applicant. By Lemma 2.6, we know that p 0 is matched in M to some applicant x 0 such that f (x 0 ) = p 0 . Thus, our path starts with p 0 , x 0 . To extend the path from
; otherwise, the path ends at x i . Notice that if x i ∈ C s , then x i+1 ∈ C t for some t < s, which means the path must be simple. The cost of this path is at least λ M ( p), which in turn is at least λ min M (y, M(y)). Therefore, the change in satisfaction among applicants in the path and y to go from M to M is at most w(y) − λ min M (y, M(y)) ≤ 0. Let P be the set of promotion paths induced by those applicants that prefer M to M. We say a path in P is maximal if there is no other path in P that includes it. The set of maximal promotion paths is disjoint and spans all applicants that prefer M to M. Therefore, by bounding the change in satisfaction for each maximal promotion path individually, we get that the satisfaction of M with respect of M cannot be positive and thus M is not more popular than M. Because M is a generic matching, it follows that M is popular.
Now it is easy to show that every well-formed matching is popular, provided the weights are sufficiently spread apart. PROOF. Let M be a well-formed matching, and let p 0 , x 0 , . . . , p j , x j be a promotion path out of p 0 . Notice that w(x t ) > w(x t+1 ) for all t < j. Thus, the cost of the path is
where the inequalities follow from the fact that the weights of the applicants decrease geometrically as we go along the path. Let x ∈ C i be an applicant. It follows that λ
. Therefore, by Lemma 2.9, the matching M must be popular.
Pruning Edges
The procedure PRUNE-STRICT computes a label λ( p) for every f i -job p. Based on these labels, the algorithm decides which edges to prune. Lemma 2.11 relates λ( p) and λ M ( p) for well-formed matchings M in the pruned graph. We now describe the procedure PRUNE-STRICT whose pseudo-code is given in Figure 2 . The algorithm works in iterations. The ith iteration consists of two steps. First, we prune some edges incident to vertices in C i , making sure that these edges do not belong to any popular matching. Second, we label all the f i jobs so that Lemma 2.11 holds for them. We use the notation λ min (x, r) as a shorthand for min q λ(q), where q is a job that x prefers to r; if there is no such job, we define λ min (x, r) = ∞.
LEMMA 2.11. Let M be any well-formed matching in the pruned graph after the ith iteration of
PROOF. We only need to show that λ( p) = λ M ( p) for an arbitrary f i job p at the end of the ith iteration. We prove the property by induction on i. In the first iteration, we do not prune any edges. Notice that a promotion path out of an f 1 job must end in its C 1 mate, and thus the cost of such a promotion path is w 1 . Line 1 sets the label of all f 1 jobs to w 1 , so the base case (i = 1) holds.
For the inductive step, consider the ith iteration for some i > 1. By the inductive hypothesis, we know the property holds for all f j jobs where j < i. Consider an applicant x ∈ C i . Let q be a job that x prefers to f (x). By definition of the first job, q must be an f j job for some j < i; therefore, in any well-formed matching included in the pruned graph, the minimum cost promotion path out q has cost λ(q). We can use the path to free q and then promote x to it, in which case the total change in satisfaction is w i − λ(q). Therefore, if λ min (x, f (x)) < w i , then no popular matching exists. Lines 3-5 check for this. From now on we assume that λ min (x, f (x)) ≥ w i for all x ∈ C i . Let p be an f i job and S be the set of applicants in C i whose first job is p; also let M be a well-formed matching contained in the pruned graph. Suppose S consists of just one applicant x; then (x, p) must belong to M. A promotion path out of p with respect to M either ends at x or continues with another job that x prefers to p. Therefore, if we set λ( p) = min(w i , λ min (x, f (x)) − w i ), the property holds for p. Lines 8-9 capture this. On the other hand, if |S| > 1, only one of the applicants in S will be matched to p while the rest must get their second job. Suppose M( p) = x for some x ∈ S. By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a promotion path with respect to M out of p with cost λ min (x, p) − w i that can be used to free p, which in turn allows us to promote one of the other applicants in S − x to p. Therefore, if λ min (x, p) < 2w i , M is not popular, which means that the edge (x, p) cannot belong to any popular matching and can safely be pruned. Therefore, if we set λ( p) = w i , the property holds for p because, in the pruned graph, p can be matched only to x ∈ S such that λ min (x, p) ≥ 2w i . Lines 10-13 capture exactly this.
Finally, after all the λ( p) labels have been computed, Lines 14-15 prune edges (x, s(x) ) that cannot be part of any popular matching because of promotion paths out of jobs between f (x) and s(x) on x's list, with cost λ min (x, s(x)) < w i . To exemplify how PRUNE-STRICT works, let us run the algorithm on the instance in Figure 1 . The jobs are labeled λ(A) = 7, λ(C) = 3, and λ(D) = 2. The only edge pruned is (x 3 , D) because both x 3 and x 4 have D as their first job and λ min (x 3 , D) = 3 < 4 = 2w(x 3 ). Hence, the only well-formed matching included in the pruned graph PROOF. We have argued that no pruned edge can be present in any popular matching, so let us now show that every well-formed matching M in the pruned graph is indeed popular. Let x ∈ C i be an applicant. If x gets f (x) in M, then by Lemma 2.11 and Lines 4-5, we have λ
. Therefore, by Lemma 2.9, it follows that M is popular. It is entirely possible that the pruned graph does not contain any well-formed matching. In this case, we know that no popular matching exists.
Implementation
Let G be the graph with edge set {(x, f (x)), (x, s(x) ) | x ∈ A}. Assuming the applicants are already partitioned into categories C i , we can compute G in O(n+ m) time. The pruning procedure also takes linear time, because the ith iteration takes O( x∈C i deg H (x)) time. Let G be the pruned graph. Finding a popular matching reduces to finding a well-formed matching in G . Abraham et al. [2007] showed how to build a well-formed matching for unweighted instances (k = 1), if one exists, in linear time. The unweighted setting is slightly simpler than ours. More specifically, the set of second jobs is disjoint from the set of first jobs and every applicant in G has degree exactly 2. These two issues can be easily handled: First, for every edge (x, s(x)) in G, if s(x) happens to be someone else's first job, then prune the edge (x, s(x)). Second, iteratively find an applicant x with degree 1, let p be x's unique neighbor, add (x, p) to the matching, and remove x and p from G . All these modifications can be carried out in O(n + m) time. If at the end some applicant has degree 0, there is no well-formed matching, and consequently no popular matching. Otherwise, every applicant has degree 2 and the set of f jobs is disjoint from the set of s jobs; thus, we can apply directly the linear time algorithm of Abraham et al. [2007] . THEOREM 2.13. In the case of strict preference lists, we can find a weighted popular matching, or determine that none exists, in O(n + m) time.
Recall that, at the beginning, we modified the instance by adding a dummy job at the end of each applicant's list. A natural objective would be to find a popular matching that minimizes the number of applicants getting a dummy job. The cited work also shows how to do this in O(n + m) time; thus, it carries over to our problem.
PREFERENCE LISTS WITH TIES
Needless to say, if ties are allowed in the preference lists, the solution from the previous section no longer works. We will work out an alternative definition for first and second jobs, which will lead to a new definition of well-formed matchings. As in the case without ties, if a matching is popular, then it must be well formed, but the converse does not always hold. We will show how to prune some edges that cannot be part of any popular matching to arrive at the goal that every well-formed matching in this pruned graph is popular.
Let us start by revising the notion of first job; our definition is procedural and recursive. For x ∈ C 1 , let f (x) be the set of jobs on x's list with the highest rank. Let G 1 be the graph with edges between applicants in C 1 and their first jobs. We say that a job/applicant is critical in G 1 if it is matched in every maximum matching of G 1 . For x ∈ C i , define f (x) as the highest-ranked jobs on x's list that are noncritical in all G j for j < i. The graph G i includes edges in G i−1 and edges between applicants in C i and their first jobs. We note that a critical node in G i may be noncritical in G j for some j > i.
If x ∈ C i is noncritical in G i , we define s(x) as the highest-ranked set of jobs on x's list that are noncritical in G j for all j ≤ i. If x is critical in G i , then s(x) is the empty set.
Before proceeding to our definition of well-formed matching in the context of ties, we review some basic notions of matching theory. The following definitions are all with respect to a given matching M. An alternating path is a simple path that alternates between matched and free edges. An augmenting path is an alternating path that starts and ends with a free vertex. An exchange path is an alternating path that starts with a matched edge and ends with a free vertex. We can update M along an augmenting or exchange path P to get the matching M ⊕ P, the symmetric difference of M and P. With a slight abuse of notation, we will allow to update a matching using an alternating path that ends on a vertex u matched outside the path; in this case, before doing the update we extend the alternating path to include (u, M(u) ) so as to make sure that the path always ends with a free vertex or a matched edge. In our proofs, we will make use of the following property of noncritical nodes, which is a part of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition [Schrijver 2003 ].
LEMMA 3.1. Let G be a bipartite graph and let v be a noncritical vertex. Then, in every maximum matching M of G, there exists an alternating path starting at v and ending with a free vertex.

PROOF. If v is free in M, the lemma is trivially true, so assume that v is matched in M.
Because v is noncritical, there is a maximum matching O in which v is free. In O ⊕ M, there must be an alternating path with respect to M of even length that starts at v and ends with a vertex free in M.
LEMMA 3.2. For every applicant x ∈ A we have f (x) ∩ s(x) = ∅.
PROOF. Let x ∈ C i . If x is critical, s(x) = ∅, so the statement is trivially true. If x is noncritical, we claim that all nodes in f (x) must be critical, which implies f (x) ∩ s(x) = ∅. For the sake of contradiction, assume there is a job p ∈ f (x) that is not critical in G i . Let M be a maximum matching in G i that leaves p unmatched. By Lemma 3.1, there is an alternating path in G i starting at x ending in a free vertex. We can use this path to free x, without changing the cardinality of the matching, and the match x to p to get a bigger matching in G i . This is a contradiction, so the claim holds.
and every applicant x is matched within f (x) ∪ s(x).
Notice that when there are no ties, all these definitions are identical to the ones given in the previous section. The next three lemmas prove Theorem 2.4 under the new definition of well formed.
LEMMA 3.4. Let M be a popular matching. Then, for all x ∈ A, either M(x) ∈ f (x) or x prefers any job in f (x) to M(x).
PROOF. Assume the lemma is false. Let i be the smallest index such that there exists x ∈ C i matched to a job p such that p / ∈ f (x) and x does not prefer any job in f (x) to p. By definition of first job, p must be critical in G s for some s < i. Therefore, there must be an augmenting path P in M s from p to an applicant y ∈ C t , for some t ≤ s. Notice that y is free in M s and s < i, so it must be the case that y prefers any job in f (y) to M(y). Updating the matching along the path, we get change in satisfaction of w(y) − w(x) > 0. Thus, M is not popular, a contradiction.
LEMMA 3.5. Let M be a popular matching. Then, for all i, M i
PROOF. The proof is by contradiction. Let i be the smallest index such that M i is not maximum in G i . This means there is an augmenting path P in G i with respect to M i going from an applicant x ∈ C i to some job p. While P is augmenting with respect to M i , it may not be augmenting with respect to to M because M i is a subset of M, and consequently p or x could be matched in M with an edge not in G i . First we note that if x is matched in M, then, by Lemma 3.4, x prefers any job in f (x) to M(x). Similarly, if p is matched in M to an applicant y ∈ C s for some s ≤ i, then y prefers any job in f (y) to p. Our plan is to use P to improve the overall satisfaction of the applicants, thus arriving at the contradiction that M is not popular. There are a few cases to consider based on p's mate:
Case 1: p is free in M. We can directly use the augmenting path to update M, x gets a better job, while other applicants in the path just switch from one first job to another, so no one is worse off. The change in satisfaction is w(x) > 0.
Case 2: p is matched in M to x. We can add (x, p) to P to form an alternating cycle in G with respect to M. Updating M with the cycle improves the satisfaction by w(x) > 0.
Case 3: p is matched in M to y ∈ C s for some s > i. Adding the edge (y, p) to P, we get an exchange path to update the matching. The change in satisfaction is w(x)−w(y) > 0.
Case 4: p is matched in M to y ∈ C s for some s ≤ i and there exists q ∈ f (y) such that q ∈ P. Recall that y prefers q to p. We create an alternating cycle by replacing the section of P before q with the edge (y, q). Updating the matching along the cycle improves the satisfaction by w(y).
Case 5: p is matched in M to y ∈ C s for some s ≤ i and there exists q ∈ f (y) such that M(q) ∈ C t for some t ≥ s. Recall that y prefers q to p. Assume q / ∈ P; otherwise, we are in Case 4. Demote M(q), promote y to q, and update the matching using P. The overall change in satisfaction is w(x) + w(y) − w(M(q)) ≥ w(x) > 0.
Case 6: p is matched in M to y ∈ C s for some s < i. Let q be a job in f (y). Assume that q / ∈ P and M(q) ∈ C t for t < s; otherwise, we fall in a case already handled. Recall that y prefers q to p. We update M along P to get M . Note that y is free in M . Also, for all j ≤ s, since M j was maximum in G j , it follows that M j must also be maximum in G j . Notice that since q / ∈ P, M (q) = M(q), so M (q) ∈ C t for some t < s. By definition of f (y), q is noncritical in G s−1 . By Lemma 3.1, we can find an exchange path Q with respect to M s−1 starting at q and ending at a job r free in M s−1 . We claim that r cannot be free in M s ; otherwise, M s would not be maximum in G s , since the edge (y, q) followed by Q would be an augmenting path with respect to M s . Therefore, M(r) ∈ C s . Updating M along Q to free q and promoting y to q gives us a new matching M . The satisfaction of M with respect to M is w(x) + w(y) − w(M(r)) = w i + w s − w s > 0; thus, M cannot be popular.
Case 7: p is matched in M to y ∈ C i . Consider a matching O maximum in G i . Let P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P a be the set of augmenting paths M i ⊕ O. The paths are disjoint and a = |O| − |M i |. For all t < i, the matching M t is maximum in G t , so each P j starts at x j ∈ C i and ends at some p j , both free in M i . Let y j be M( p j ), q j be a job in f (y j ), and z j = M(q j ). Assume y j ∈ C i − {x 1 , . . . , x a }, q j / ∈ P j , and w(z j ) > w(y j )-otherwise, we fall in a case already handled. Now suppose that q 1 belongs to P h for some h = 1; then we can replace the portion of the path P h before q 1 with the edge (y 1 , q 1 ), update M along the resulting path, and then update along P 1 to improve the satisfaction by w i + w i − w i > 0. Thus, we can assume that q 1 / ∈ P h for all h. We update M along all paths P 1 , . . . , P a to get a matching M . Notice that M is maximum in G t for all t ≤ i. Notice that q 1 is noncritical in G i−1 . By Lemma 3.1, we can find an exchange path Q with respect to M i−1 starting at q 1 and ending at a job r free in M i−1 . If r = M (x i ) for all i, then updating M along Q to free q 1 , and then promoting y 1 to q 1 , gives an overall change in satisfaction of w(
On the other hand, if r = M (x i ) for some i, then give x i its original job M(x i ), update the matching along Q, and promote y 1 to q, which improves the satisfaction by w i . Notice that in the last exchange, we assumed M(x i ) was free in M , or equivalently, that M(x i ) = p j for all j and i. Indeed, if M(x i ) = p j for some j and i, then we can join together P j and P i using the edge (x i , p j ) and update M along the resulting path to improve the satisfaction by
These seven cases are exhaustive. In each case, we have reached the contradiction that the satisfaction of M can be improved. Therefore, our assumption that there exists i such that M i is not maximum in G i must be false. PROOF. Let x ∈ C i . If x is critical in G i , then by Lemma 3.5, it must be matched within f (x). Let us assume then that x is noncritical in G i , and, thus, that s(x) is nonempty. Note that all jobs that x prefers to s(x) are critical in G i ; among these, only those in f (x) have an edge to x in G i . Thus, if Lemma 3.5 is to hold, x must prefer any job p ∈ s(x) to M(x). Note that p cannot be free in M; otherwise, promoting x to p immediately improves the satisfaction.
Consider the applicant y = M( p) and suppose y ∈ C s . If s > i, then y can be demoted and x promoted to p to improve the satisfaction by w i − w s > 0. If 1 < s ≤ i, the job p is strictly worse than any job q ∈ f (y). Using the fact that q is noncritical in G s−1 , we find an exchange path in M s−1 to a free (in M s−1 ) job r, which must be matched in M s to z ∈ C s . Updating along the path and promoting x to p improves the satisfaction by w i + w s − w s > 0. Finally, if s = 1, we can simply promote y to q and demote whoever was matched to q; the change in satisfaction is
This finishes the proof of Theorem 2.4 under the new definition of well-formed matching. Thus, every popular matching is contained in G, the graph consisting of those edges between applicants and their first and second jobs. Because the new definition of wellformed matching generalizes the one for strict preferences, we again encounter the problem that not every well-formed matching is popular. We proceed as before, pruning certain edges that are not part of any popular matching. Finally, we show that every well-formed matching in the pruned graph is popular.
Pruning Procedure
We start by revising the definition of promotion path and how it can be used to update a well-formed matching M. Let M be a well-formed matching. Our promotion path starts at p 0 , a job critical in G i 0 but noncritical in G t for all t < i 0 . We find an alternating path in G i 0 with respect to M i 0 from p 0 to x 0 that starts and ends with a matched edge; we augment along the path to get M . Let p 1 be a job that, according to x 0 , is better than f (x 0 ) (or as good, but not in f (x 0 )). Note that p 1 is critical in G t for some t < i 0 . Let p 1 be critical in G i 1 but noncritical in G t for all t < i 1 . Since w(x 0 ) < w(x 1 ), the matching M j is still maximum in G g for all g ≤ i 1 . Find a similar alternating path in G i 1 with respect to M i 1 from p 1 to x 1 , update M , and so on. Finally, every applicant x i is assigned to p i+1 , except x s , the last applicant in the path, who is demoted. The cost of the path is defined as the satisfaction of M with respect to M , or equivalently, w(x s ) minus the weight of those applicants x i<s who find p i+1 strictly better than f (x i ) (recall that p i+1 may be as good as, but not in f (x i )). This is the price to pay, in terms of satisfaction, to free p 0 using the path. Again, we use λ M ( p) to denote the minimum cost of any such promotion path out of job p, and λ min M (x, p) to denote min λ M (q) where q is a job that x prefers to p. In addition, let us define λ equiv M (x) = min q λ(x), where q / ∈ f (x) but has the same rank as other jobs in f (x).
To see why this is the right definition, let M be a well-formed matching and M be any other matching. Suppose y prefers M to M. We will construct a promotion path starting at p 0 = M (y). Since M is well formed, p 0 must be critical; let i 0 be the smallest i such that p 0 is critical in G i . Taking M i 0 ⊕ M i 0 , we can find an alternating path that starts with ( p 0 , M( p 0 )) and ends at x 0 , which is free in M i 0 -the path cannot end in a job that is free in M i 0 because p 0 is critical. Either x 0 gets a worse job under M , in which case the promotion path ends, or gets a job p 1 , which is better than f (x 0 ), or just as good but does not belong to f (x 0 ). We continue growing the path until we run into an applicant x s who prefers M to M ; notice that since i j > i j+1 , we are bound to find such an applicant. Now, if the cost of the path is less than w(y), then we know the well-formed matching M is not popular. On the other hand, if the cost of the path induced by y is at least w(y), for all such y, we can prove that M is not more popular than M.
We are ready to discuss the algorithm PRUNE-TIES for pruning the graph in the presence of ties, which is given in Figure 3 . In the ith iteration, we prune some edges incident to applicants in C i , making sure these edges do not belong to any popular matching, and assign a label λ( p) to those jobs p that became critical in G i . This is done in a careful way so that the following lemma holds. 
PROOF. We prove the lemma by induction on i. In the first iteration we do not prune any edges from G 1 . Let p be a critical job in G 1 , and M be a maximum matching in G 1 . Every alternating path with respect to M out of p must end in some applicant in C 1 . Line 1 sets λ( p) = w 1 , which takes care of the base case.
For the ith iteration, we assume the property holds for those jobs critical in G j for some j < i. Suppose there exists an applicant x ∈ C i such that λ min (x, f (x)) < w i . Then in every well-formed matching in the pruned graph we can find a promotion path to free a job p that x prefers to f (x), and then promote x to p. This improves the satisfaction by w i − λ min (x, f (x)) > 0. Therefore, no popular matching exists. Lines 3-5 check for this. From now on we assume λ min (x, f (x)) ≥ w(x). Consider a vertex x ∈ C j , for some j ≤ i, that is noncritical in G i . We claim that if λ min (x, f (x)) < w j + w i or λ equiv (x) < w i , then the edges (x, f (x)) cannot be part of any popular matching and can thus be pruned. Indeed, let O be a matching maximum in G t for all t ≤ i and included in the pruned graph such that O(x) ∈ f (x); we will show that O cannot be a subset of any popular matching. Because x is noncritical in G i , we know there is an exchange path with respect to O from x to some applicant y ∈ C s such that j ≤ s ≤ i; otherwise, O s would not be maximum in G s . Augment along the path to get O . While the matching O may not be maximum in G j (in case j < s), it is still maximum in G t for all t < j. By the inductive hypothesis, we can find a promotion path to free a job p that can then be given to x; note that because s ≥ j, the changes needed to free p do not affect y. This improves the satisfaction of the matching; therefore, O cannot be included in any popular matching. Since the edges (x, f (x)) cannot be part of any popular matching, they can safely be pruned. Lines 6-8 check this.
Finally, we must compute λ( p) for jobs p that are critical in G i but noncritical in all G t where t < i. Lines 9-11 take care of this. The rest of the proof is devoted to proving the correctness of these lines. Let S( p, M) be the set of applicants that can be reached from p with an alternating path in M i that starts and ends with a matched edge. Any promotion path in M out of p must begin with such an alternating path from p to some applicant x ∈ S( p, M). We consider cost of three different types of promotion paths based on what comes after x:
Type 1: The promotion path ends at x. Since updating the matching with this promotion path leaves x unmatched, while everyone else is indifferent, the cost of this type of promotion path is w(x).
Type 2: The promotion path continues with a job q such that x is indifferent between q and any job in f (x) but q / ∈ f (x). Notice that q must be critical in G s for some s < i. By inductive hypothesis, the cost of freeing q is λ(q). After q is freed, we assign it to x, who is indifferent between M(x) and q. Therefore, the best cost of this type of promotion path to free p is λ equiv (x). Type 3: The promotion path continues from a job q such that x strictly prefers q to any job in f (x). Notice again that q must be critical in G s for some s < i. By inductive hypothesis, the cost of freeing q is λ(q). After q is freed, we assign it to x, who strictly prefers it to M(x). Therefore, the best cost of this type of promotion path to free p is
Since every promotion path to free p must be of one of these three types, it follows that
The first thing to note is that because p is noncritical in G i−1 , there must an alternating path in M i−1 from p to a job q that is unmatched in M i−1 , and that, because p is critical in M i , the job q must be matched in M i to an applicant y ∈ C i , which means that y ∈ S( p, M) and thus λ M ( p) ≤ w(y) = w i . The second thing to note is that for any x ∈ S( p, M) that is noncritical in G i , we have min(λ min (x, f (x)) − w(x), λ equiv (x)) ≥ w i ; otherwise, the algorithm would have pruned (x, M(x) ) along with all other edges connecting x to f (x). Let S( p, M) be the subset of applicants in S( p, M) that are critical in G i . It follows from the previous discussion that λ M 
Let O be the matching used in the pruning algorithm to compute S in Line 10. The matching O should be well formed; in particular, O j should be maximum in G j for all 
and the lemma holds for p.
The last thing to consider is noncritical applicants x who may get their second job. We can promote them to a job p strictly better than s(x) and start a promotion path from there. If such exchange improves the satisfaction, then the edges (x, s(x)) must be pruned. This is done in Lines 12-13. PROOF. We have shown that if there exists a popular matching, it must be well formed and be contained in G . The proof that every well-formed matching M in the pruned graph is popular is similar to that for strict preferences. Let M be any other matching; we argue that M is not more popular than M. Suppose x prefers M to M. This induces a promotion path out of M (x) with respect to M. If x gets f (x) in M, then the cost of such a path is at least w i . Otherwise, M(x) = s(x) and Lines 12-13 make sure the cost of such a promotion path is at least w i . Since this holds for every applicant x, M cannot be more popular than M.
So far we have been concerned with showing the correctness of the algorithm. In the next section, we show how to implement these ideas efficiently.
Implementation
First, we need to compute f (x) and s(x) for every applicant x ∈ A; we do so in iterations. For x ∈ C 1 , computing f (x) is trivial. Now build G 1 and find a maximum matching M 1 in G 1 . Using the algorithm of Hopcroft and Karp [1973] , this can be done in O(min( √ n, |M 1 |)m) time. The set of critical jobs in G 1 can be computed in O(m) time by growing a Hungarian tree [Papadimitriou and Steiglitz 1998 ] from those jobs that are free in M 1 : by Lemma 3.1, those jobs that are reachable from a free job by an alternating path must be noncritical and those jobs that are not reachable from any free job must be critical. Using this information, compute s(x) for all x ∈ C 1 and f (y) for all y ∈ C 2 . Now construct G 2 , augment M 1 to get a maximum matching M 2 in G 2 , and so on. PROOF. At the beginning of the ith iteration, we have available λ( p) for all jobs that are critical in some G <i . Using this information, it is easy to compute λ min (x, f (x)) and λ equiv (x) in O(deg H (x)) time for each x ∈ C i . With this information, Lines 3-8 can be done in O(m) time.
Note that, for each p critical in G i but noncritical in all G <i , Lines 10-11 can be implemented in linear time: grow a Hungarian tree with respect to M i out of p, keep track of the applicants x that can be reached from p, and find the one minimizing min{w(x), λ min (x, f (x)), λ equiv (x)}. But we would like to carry out this computation for all such jobs within the same time bounds. This can be done provided the applicants x are sorted in nondecreasing value of min{w(x), λ min (x, f (x)), λ equiv (x)}: instead of growing Hungarian trees from the jobs, we grow Hungarian trees from the matched applicants in sorted order. When growing a tree out of applicant x, we mark the nodes we visit and do not explore edges that lead to nodes that have already been marked. Suppose that job p critical in G i was marked by applicant x, then clearly λ( p) = min{w i , λ min (x, f (x)), λ equiv (x)}. Because a node is never explored after it has been marked, the overall work is O(m). If we have a sorted list of applicants in C <i , adding the applicants C i takes O(|C i | log n) time if we maintain the list using a balanced search tree.
Finally, after G is computed and pruned, we must find a well-formed matching in it. This problem can be reduced to finding a rank-maximal matching, which can be done in time O(min(k √ n, n)m) [Irving et al. 2006] . Edges between x ∈ C i and f (x) get a rank of i, and edges from applicants to their second jobs get a rank of k + 1. If the resulting rank-maximal matching is well-formed (i.e., applicant complete and maximum in all G i graphs), then we have a popular matching; otherwise, no popular matching exists. Finding a popular matching of maximum cardinality (i.e., one that minimizes the assignment of dummy last-resort jobs) can be done within the same time bounds. Note that if f (x) = {l(x)}, then the pair (x, l(x)) will be in every well-formed matching, so there is no point in minimizing these edges. If s(x) = {l(x)}, we can give the edge (x, l(x)) a rank of k + 2. Finding a rank-maximal matching in the new instance gives us a popular matching with maximum cardinality.
CONCLUSION
We have developed efficient algorithms for finding weighted popular matchings, a natural generalization of popular matchings. It would be interesting to study other definitions of the more popular than relation. For example, define the satisfaction of M to R to be the sum (or any linear combination) of the differences of the ranks of the jobs each applicant gets in M and R. Finding a popular matching under this new definition can be reduced to maximum weight matching, and vice versa. Defining the satisfaction to be a positive linear combination of the sign of the differences, we get weighted popular matchings. We leave as an open problem to study other definitions that use a function "in between" these two extremes. Ideally, we would like to have efficient algorithms that can handle any odd step function.
